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ANTITRUST’S “CURSE OF BIGNESS” PROBLEM
D. Daniel Sokol*
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE. By
Tim Wu. New York: Columbia Global Reports. 2018. Pp. 14, 139.
$14.99.
INTRODUCTION
Tim Wu1 is the most important academic popularizer of law and tech-
nology debates2 and is the intellectual leader of the neo-Brandeisian antitrust
movement. He has brought antitrust from a technical subject of interest only
to antitrust practitioners and academics to the forefront of policy discussions
around the world. His ability to help shape policy is impressive. He is smart
and a beautiful writer—an effective combination. Merely for making anti-
trust relevant to the general population, Wu deserves credit.
Wu’s most recent book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the Gilded
Age, is an attempt to reframe contemporary antitrust debates by returning
antitrust to its more populist roots. Given the global implications of his ideas
and policy proposals (including breakup of tech platforms) for many of the
large corporations that he takes on, The Curse of Bigness offers profound in-
sights for how society and business should be organized.
Antitrust and scrutiny of large tech platforms like Amazon and Face-
book are hot issues in policy circles. For critics like Wu, the growing concen-
tration of American power and the rise of tech platforms are nothing less
than a threat to American democracy (pp. 16, 55). Wu sees the current
growth of large tech companies as the result of a generation of antitrust legal
misapplication and harks back to an earlier era of significant antitrust en-
forcement (pp. 17–21).
Wu’s work is powerful and provocative. He makes several important
points about how to think about the body of antitrust law. Wu would aban-
don the current legal framework of antitrust. However, although antitrust
has made some tactical mistakes over forty years, the antitrust enterprise is
not broken in need of total retrofit. Moreover, Wu’s policy prescriptions are
not sensitive to administrability concerns. Antitrust law is akin to common
* University of Florida Research Foundation Professor of Law, University of Florida,
and Senior Advisor, White & Case LLP.
1. Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science and Technology, Columbia Law School.
2. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006); TIM WU,
THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS (2016); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010) [hereinafter WU, THE MASTER SWITCH]; Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
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law.3 Congress has purposely chosen not to make significant changes in anti-
trust’s fundamental structure but has left it to the courts to fill in the gaps.
Given this reality, more constructive criticisms would go to how to shift doc-
trine in ways that might promote some of the changes that Wu seeks.4
The first part of this Review summarizes Wu’s major claims. It then
highlights some of his critiques as to “bigness,” the multiple goals of anti-
trust, and the missed opportunities as to cases that should have been or need
to be brought, such as against tech companies. Some of Wu’s critiques are
spot on in identifying missed opportunities, like a number of horizontal
mergers that should have been challenged. Where Wu’s book suffers is
where he undervalues the institutional structure of antitrust law, underplays
what antitrust does well as a substantive matter, and misanalyzes antitrust
and tech platforms.
I. POLITICALANTITRUST?
The Curse of Bigness is a fundamental challenge to the “Chicago School”
and its approach to the analysis of antitrust law that has dominated the Unit-
ed States since the 1970s. Robert Pitofsky wrote an important article in 1979
that guides Wu’s analysis. Published in the famous symposium issue of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the article signaled the end not
merely of populism but of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.5
Pitofsky chastised antitrust scholars for “persuading the courts to adopt an
exclusively economic approach to antitrust questions.”6 He argued that “[i]t
is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws.”7 Pitofsky explained political values in a pop-
ulist manner by noting,
if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under anti-
trust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will
be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be im-
possible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.8
Wu’s book is part of this legacy. Wu is a powerful writer and explores similar
themes with great passion and resolve. For example, he writes, “[antitrust]
does strike at the root cause of private political power—the economic con-
centration that facilitates political action” (p. 23). Elsewhere, in describing
3. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 666 (1982).
4. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE
L.J. 2078 (2018); Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure,
and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018).
5. See p. 17; Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051
(1979).
6. Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 1051.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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the neo-Brandeisian agenda he explains, “these suggestions would help us
return to an economic vision that prizes dynamism and possibility, and ul-
timately attunes economic structure to a democratic society” (p. 138).
Wu’s major insight is to suggest that there needs to be a broader set of
goals for antitrust beyond consumer welfare to address this populist im-
pulse.9 What this looks like in practice is not something that Wu spends
much time developing.
Injecting political trade-offs into antitrust can have negative repercus-
sions. In a world of multiple goals, government may pick winners and losers
and may do so with something other than the public interest in mind.10 Wu
would replace antitrust as we know it with a regulatory system akin to what
one finds in other administrative agencies (a public interest standard with
some “fairness” element, industry comments on mergers, banning mergers
of a certain size, among others features) (pp. 127–39). This solution is sub-
ject to the same capture concerns one finds in other agencies and would not
adequately address Wu’s concerns. Wu does not provide a mechanism to
prevent special interests from lobbying to promote their interests over con-
sumers’ with a veneer of “fairness.” Indeed, Wu’s previous writing in the tel-
ecom context suggests that capture is a significant risk.11 The Robinson-
Patman Act, discussed in Section V, illustrates the folly of a public interest–
based antitrust.
Academics often change their approach following a stint in practice. Wu
had short stints in government during the Obama Administration but not in
a senior leadership role with managerial oversight in helping to run an agen-
cy. Such a position might have made Wu focus more on administrability
concerns. When Pitofsky chaired the FTC in the 1990s, he did not adopt a
populist agenda or embrace multiple goals as in his earlier writing. Rather,
he continued with the economic framework that was established by prior
Republican and Democratic administrations, and his tenure is seen as a
“golden age” of antitrust.12 Nor is Pitofsky alone in reworking his criticisms
9. See pp. 53–58, 135–39.
10. Pp. 127–39; Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 72 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O’Connell eds., 2010); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (“A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Ex-
plaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029 (2011) (reviewing
MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN
LAW (2009)).
11. WU, THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 2, at 307–08 (“Again and again in the histo-
ries I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the in-
formation industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s
through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace.”).
12. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dom-
inant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1. Howev-
er, Pitofsky had some missteps such as allowing consolidation in some industries where there
may have been anticompetitive effects.
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within an economics framework and abandoning a more populist approach
to antitrust. Indeed, Wu’s other antitrust works embrace economic analysis
to guide antitrust and do not suggest the need for noneconomic values.13
This suggests the difference between making academic pronouncements and
having to create real change given institutional constraints when handed
power.
Wu shows nuance with two sets of critiques. One is a populist critique
that Wu calls “neo-Brandeisian,” which questions the singular efficiency-
based goal expressed explicitly and repeatedly in the Supreme Court’s anti-
trust jurisprudence and practiced by the two antitrust agencies (pp. 78–92).
The second critique is within a law and economics tradition but suggests
modifications to doctrine based on flaws in Chicago School assumptions
(pp. 106–07).
Wu makes an important contribution, namely that some basic assump-
tions made by the Chicago School were crude or simply wrong and that im-
proved economic analysis based on more precise models and more informed
empirical work offers some alternative approaches for moving antitrust for-
ward. He properly articulates that some Chicago assumptions, based on
overly simplistic economics, may lead to bad results (pp. 102–09).
But Wu underestimates the current institutional setup of antitrust, in
which a bad doctrine could be reshaped into something less harmful. As a
result of the current institutional setup, antitrust addresses pure antitrust is-
sues relatively well but other issues like privacy14 or traditional regulation15
less well. After suggesting that antitrust should be about such trade-offs, Wu
does not offer insights into how to address the trade-off of efficiency and
fairness inherent in a public interest standard.16 What would an administra-
ble set of cases to guide future business behavior look like? What would the
workable legal rule be? What would be the burdens of proofs and the pre-
sumptions? On these issues, Wu does not offer detailed insights. But if the
claim is that antitrust must change because of new realities in concentration
and tech, it is incumbent on those proposing changes to offer a workable sys-
tem. The strength of the current approach is how it marries economic analy-
sis with legal administrability.17
Wu’s conception of competition would be a broader “protection of
competition” approach that focuses on the competitive process and looks
beyond price effects (p. 136). But a broader competitive process has a popu-
13. C. Scott Hemphill & TimWu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013).
14. Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection,
and The Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121 (2015).
15. See Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, in ECONOMIC
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 25 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014).
16. Perhaps this is because implicitly Wu understands that fairness is indeterminate. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969–70
(2001).
17. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 35) (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
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list element to it because it supports inefficient competitors,18 and populism
does not work within antitrust’s institutional structure. Understanding eco-
nomic analysis and antitrust’s institutional structure of judge-made law ex-
plains why antitrust has evolved and why a populist embrace, short of new
legislation, is unlikely to succeed. Antitrust is primarily federal law. But anti-
trust “common law” functions somewhat differently than other fields. Anti-
trust’s enabling legislation allows for common law–like development.19 In
practice, statutes such as the Sherman Act enjoy a certain rank akin to con-
stitutional common law.20
The Supreme Court offered an early articulation of this constitution-like
principle to the Sherman Act in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States.21
There, the Court stated, “As a charter of [economic] freedom, the [Sherman]
Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desira-
ble in constitutional provisions.”22 This framework changes how the Su-
preme Court views antitrust jurisprudence. Traditional stare decisis typically
means that the Supreme Court is reluctant to overrule its precedent.23 Anti-
trust works differently.
Unlike other areas of law, economic advances shape the rethinking of
antitrust rules. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has stepped in to revise
antitrust law, narrowing or overruling precedents based on the current un-
derstanding of economics.24 As such, stare decisis does not have the same
meaning in antitrust as it does in other fields, as precedent matters less than
changes in economic thinking.
18. Compare Wu’s account on this point with Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Democra-
cy: A Case Study from German Fascism 19 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 18-009, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164467 (on
file with theMichigan Law Review) (“[W]hat is good for consumers is good for democracy.”).
19. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 228–29 (1954) (“[I]n
adopting the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts not only to apply a set
of somewhat vague doctrines but also in doing so to make use of that ‘certain technique of ju-
dicial reasoning’ characteristic of common law courts.”).
20. Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administra-
tive Law, 41 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1463, 1473 (2000).
21. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
22. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 359–60. But see Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the
Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 292–328 (1986)
(criticizing this conceptualization).
23. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“Stare decisis is not . . . [an] inexorable command. . . . Stare decisis is usually the wise
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right. . . . even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
earlier decisions.” (third emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).
24. Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2015, at 1, 1–3 (cit-
ing Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015)).
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The Supreme Court has explained that antitrust precedent is less im-
portant than precedent in other fields. For example, in State Oil Co. v. Khan,
a case that removed the per se designation for maximum resale price
maintenance, the Court explained:
[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Con-
gress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted
view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” . . . [The] Court . . . recon-
sider[s] its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical un-
derpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.25
This view of antitrust as a variation of common law has taken hold even
in recent cases. As the Court stated in 2015 in Kimble v. Marvel Entertain-
ment, LLC, “[w]e have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis
as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents
that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”26 This explicit in-
corporation of economic analysis—and the resulting limitation of traditional
stare decisis in antitrust common law—makes antitrust unique among sub-
stantive areas of law.27
Since 1950, the basic statutory scheme of antitrust has remained con-
stant, though it has been tweaked with the introduction of premerger notifi-
cation28 and increased penalties for antitrust violations.29 To understand
what antitrust can and cannot do, it is important to understand how the
broader political economy of antitrust has shaped antitrust jurisprudence.
Fundamentally, antitrust changes gradually rather than through seismic
shifts. Thus, only by looking at the long term can one understand trends that
shape cases that can be successfully brought in court. Even if Wu were cor-
rect that antitrust enforcement has not been aggressive enough, short of leg-
islative change, antitrust is not capable of the type of enforcement profile
that he ascribes to it. Antitrust’s institutional attempt at a legislative solution
to address “fairness” is the Robinson-Patman Act.30 Its case law evolution
shows that even a protectionist statute can be reinterpreted to have a goal
25. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
26. 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015).
27. D. Daniel Sokol, Rethinking the Efficiency of the Common Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
28. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)).
29. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, 118 Stat. 661, 665-69; Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat.
3134, reenacted in Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat.
1279 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000)); Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709 (1974).
30. Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012)).
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based on economic effects, even when such a reformulation is in sharp con-
trast to the intent and actual language of the statute.31
II. MACROECONOMICCHANGES TO THEU.S. ECONOMYHELP EXPLAIN
ANTITRUST’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
Antitrust law and policy in part has responded to broader political
economy concerns. These concerns support Wu’s unease with the direction
of the U.S. economy.32 He notes the growing concentration in U.S. markets
and suggests that concentration has led to a number of ills (p. 22). Wu’s con-
cerns about economic concentration should be taken very seriously as there
have been growing disparities in wealth, health outcomes, and education,
and a growing cultural divide. Changes in antitrust law and policy may have
played some role in this. But neither Wu’s work nor that of other neo-
Brandeisians has clearly established antitrust as the cause of these broader
policy shifts.33 Wu’s story should consider other factors—like employment
and income—that implicate competition law and policy but have a benign or
even positive impact on U.S. economic performance, innovation, and other
measures of daily life for U.S. consumers.34
To provide a broader context of larger political economy shifts, this Re-
view examines four instances of the vital intersections among macroeco-
nomic factors, the industrial organization of the modern U.S. economy, and
judicial and policy responses. There is a counterstory that antitrust populists
ignore about U.S. growth—the effects of antitrust populism until the rise of
Chicago School antitrust coincided with American economic decline. As an-
titrust rules changed to be more market oriented and where the outcome was
improved economic efficiency, U.S. economic growth improved. Since the
start of the Great Recession, however, a number of measures indicate that
the U.S. economy is approaching the sickly economics of the stagnation pe-
riod of the 1970s.35 Now, the efficiency-based assumptions of modern anti-
trust are being questioned, and policy may respond as a result. But the
circumstances between the 1970s and 2010s are distinct in terms of the shift
within the Supreme Court and the antitrust agencies. Whereas the executive
31. D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064, 2065–
69 (2015).
32. Pp. 19–23. I want to thank Dale Collins for bringing the issue of broader political
economy shifts to my attention and providing my initial data and sources (since revised) for
the first three periods.
33. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 716–17,
721–37 (2018) (exploring the data and critiquing populist attacks).
34. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2003, at 27; Sam Peltzman, Industrial Concentration Under the Rule of Reason, 57 J.L. & ECON.
S101 (2014); Lawrence J. White & Jasper Yang, What Has Been Happening to Aggregate Con-
centration in the U.S. Economy in the 21st Century?, SSRN (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953984 (on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
35. 2 ALLANH.MELTZER, AHISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE chs. 4–7 (2009).
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and legislative branches sat out of antitrust’s shift to an efficiency-based goal
for the most part (other than by appointing agency leadership that believed
in economic effects),36 change today focuses on these two branches in terms
of possible legislative reform to antitrust law and candidates who would ap-
point antitrust leadership that would fundamentally transform antitrust.
We can divide shifts in antitrust based on four different time periods:
Period 1: good times (1950–1972); Period 2: stagnation (1973–1982); Period
3: the modern era (1982–2006); and Period 4: the “Great Recession” and be-
yond (2007–2017). Table I summarizes these results.
TABLE I
U.S. Macroeconomic Indicators
Indicator 1950–1972 1973–1982 1983–2006 2007–2017
Real GDP
(average annual growth)37
4.20% 2.40% 3.46% 1.52%
Nonfarm business productivity
(average annual rate)38
2.79% 1.14% 2.30% 1.33%
Inflation
(average annual change
December to December)39
2.79%
MAX:
6.00%
8.20%
MAX:
13.30%
3.10%
MAX:
6.30%
1.60%
MAX:
4.10%
Bank prime loan rate
(annual, beginning in 1956)40
5.10%
MAX:
8.50%
11.10%
MAX:
21.50%
8.00%
MAX:
13.00%
4.00%
MAX:
8.25%
Unemployment
(average monthly rate)41
4.80%
MAX:
6.80%
7.00%
MAX:
9.70%
5.90%
MAX:
9.60%
6.80%
MAX:
9.60%
Median real family income
(average annual change)42
3.28% -0.16% 0.92% 0.62%
36. Sokol, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30–42).
37. See Table 1.1.1 Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Apr. 26, 2019), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid
=19&step=3&isuri=1&select_all_years=0&nipa_table_list=1&series=a&first_year=1950&scale
=-99&last_year=2017&thetable=x [https://perma.cc/YK2X-H6UX].
38. See Nonfarm Business Labor Productivity (Output Per Hour), Series ID PRS85006092,
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (May 14, 2019), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/PRS85006092
[https://perma.cc/5QYD-KSL6].
39. See Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items, FRED ECON. DATA
(May 10, 2019), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=nV5V [https://perma.cc/6LAV-PK5Y].
40. See Bank Prime Loan Rate, FRED ECON. DATA (May 13, 2019),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=nV8j [https://perma.cc/72RQ-FUQ5].
41. See Unemployment Rate (16 Years and Over), Series ID PRS85006092, BUREAU LAB.
STAT. (May 14, 2019), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://perma.cc/X836-
XV9Y].
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Table I shows that the good times of Period 1 have not been replicated in
any subsequent period and that the economic stagnation of Period 2 looks
similar to Period 4 of the Great Recession and beyond. Real GDP averaged
4.20% in Period 1, 2.40% in Period 2, 3.46% in Period 3, and 1.52% in Period
4. U.S. nonfarm business productivity shows swings of 2.79% in Period 1,
1.14% in Period 2, 2.30% in Period 3, and 1.33% in Period 4. With the excep-
tion of Period 2 (average of 8.20% with a maximum of 13.30%), inflation has
been relatively low in the other periods, with averages of 2.70%, 3.10% and
1.60% in Periods 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Unemployment averaged 4.80% in
Period 1, 7.0% in Period 2, 5.90% in Period 3, and 6.80% in Period 4. Finally,
median real family income (which tells us about total income growth and
not distribution) averaged 3.28% in Period 1, -0.16% in Period 2, 0.92% in
Period 3, and 0.62% in Period 4.
The overall trend is a function of many factors. Babies were not the only
thing booming in Period 1. Rather, the entire economy boomed, and U.S.
competitiveness did not really matter when the rest of the world was still in
recovery mode post WWII.43 This boom period weakened as a costly inter-
national war (Vietnam) and increased domestic spending (Great Society)
meant that the economy struggled due to significant government spending
and lower productivity.44 In Period 2, academics, the antitrust agencies, and
ultimately the Supreme Court questioned the basis for the existing multiple-
goal antitrust regime45 as U.S. competitiveness declined. Period 3 led to a
loosening of antitrust rules and a larger liberalization of the economy. This
led to more efficient business practices, such as improved vertical integration
and economies of scale due to increased horizontal consolidation from mer-
gers.46 In Period 4, another set of international military commitments (Iraq
and Afghanistan) and increased domestic spending with resulting economic
hardship (Great Recession)47 led people to question the antitrust regime.48 If
42. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: FAMILIES tbl.F-7,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-
families.html [https://perma.cc/QU2T-6WV7].
43. Dale W. Jorgenson, Productivity and Postwar U.S. Economic Growth, J. ECON.
PERSP., Fall 1988, at 23.
44. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1929–1982
(1985).
45. Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911,
1911–13 (2009) (reviewing ROBERT PITOFSKY, HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE
MARK (2008)).
46. Shantanu Dutta et al., Vertical Territorial Restrictions and Public Policy: Theories
and Industry Evidence, J. MARKETING, Oct. 1999, at 121; Peltzman, supra note 34.
47. Ryan D. Edwards, U.S. War Costs: Two Parts Temporary, One Part Permanent, 113 J.
PUB. ECON. 54 (2014); John B. Taylor, The Role of Policy in the Great Recession and the Weak
Recovery, 104 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS&PROC.) 61 (2014).
48. E.g., ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL
FOR PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 4 (2018),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopso
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market competition no longer delivered in Period 4 in terms of macroeco-
nomic gains, it is perhaps not surprising that we have witnessed the rise of
antitrust populism to match the rise of overall populism.
From the antitrust perspective, these four periods identify several im-
portant procedural and substantive shifts. These political changes are linked
to the types of cases that parties (government or private plaintiffs) were will-
ing to bring before the courts. Ultimately it is the courts that shape antitrust
policy, as business practices occur in the shadow of antitrust rulings. Under-
standing the larger political economy also explains why populism has
reemerged—the current group of populists do not like the court outcomes
on either substantive or procedural antitrust and believe that the current
economic disruption will not be solved by the courts.49 This meta-analysis
also explains the impact of antitrust’s institutional structure. Courts con-
strain agencies in the types of cases that can be brought and won.
Period 1 identifies a time in case law with rigid antitrust rules making
much behavior was per se illegal or de facto per se illegal. This period includ-
ed cases in which the Supreme Court pushed case law that restricted hori-
zontal mergers,50 vertical mergers,51 and conglomerate mergers;52 doubted
efficiencies;53 showed concern about dominant firms;54 and especially re-
stricted vertical restraints55 and joint ventures.56 On procedural issues, the
ny_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU67-BDBW]; A BETTER DEAL:
CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE MONOPOLIES AND THE ABUSE OF ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL POWER 1, http://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/A-
Better-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GYY-YVLN]; Sebastian Payne,
Opinion, Time to Rethink Antitrust?, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com
/content/72d9a1e0-7824-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d [https://perma.cc/QZ3L-CX2L].
49. Barak Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2017).
50. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275, 277 (1966) (“[T]he basic
purpose of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the Ameri-
can economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in business . . . by arresting a
trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the point that a
market was left in the grip of a few big companies.”); United States v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
51. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“But we cannot fail
to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these compet-
ing considerations in favor of decentralization.”).
52. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); United States v. El Paso
Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
53. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 580.
54. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (grappling
with the implications of dominant and monopolizing firms but finding that defendant’s domi-
nation of the cellophane market was not a violation of the Sherman Act).
55. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151–54 (1968); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1967); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7–8
(1958).
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Court provided a permissive view of government timing of enforcement.57
This period, from an antitrust jurisprudential perspective, reflected concern
regarding political and economic power. For example, in Alcoa, dicta includ-
ed the assertion that “great industrial consolidations are inherently undesir-
able, regardless of their economic results.”58 Similarly, in Procter & Gamble,
the Court identified that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense
to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competi-
tion may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of pro-
tecting competition.”59 To a certain extent, size and concentration were to be
feared. For example, a combined grocery store market share of 7.5% in Von’s
Grocery resulted in the Supreme Court blocking the merger because the
market was “characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewer and
fewer owner-competitors which is exactly the sort of trend which Con-
gress . . . declared must be arrested.”60 Such jurisprudence was possible dur-
ing a time when the macroeconomic factors were such that efficiency was
less important because the economy was doing so well overall.
By the time we reach Period 2, the U.S. economy was in relative de-
cline.61 Antitrust jurisprudence began to shift during this period, in part be-
cause of new economic learning but in part because there was less slack in an
economy in which the United States was less competitive globally. The loos-
ening occurs in several areas: mergers,62 vertical restraints,63 standing,64 spe-
cific-intent requirements in criminal antitrust cases,65 and the abandonment
of several cases where economic learning suggested that the cases were mis-
taken.66
Period 3 and a Reagan Administration–led “Chicago” revolution gave an
intellectual basis for courts to loosen antitrust rules significantly. Instead,
they promoted antitrust intellectual “goals” and ideological stability based on
56. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606–12 (1972); United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352–58 (1967).
57. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967); United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50
(1948).
58. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
59. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
60. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966).
61. See Richard R. Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall of American Technological
Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1931, 1955–60
(1992).
62. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494–504 (1974).
63. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 16–24 (1979); Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 42–47 (1977).
64. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 447, 484–89 (1977).
65. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436–443 (1978).
66. William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of
the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1136–41 (1989).
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a consumer welfare standard resolved from the Bush I to Bush II period.67
This period also included significant U.S. growth in productivity.68 In terms
of antitrust law developments, during this period, enforcement by courts and
antitrust agencies increased the difficulty of finding concerted action,69
heightened procedural hurdles,70 focused horizontal mergers on finding an-
ticompetitive effect,71 and validated merger efficiencies.72 This period also
saw a shift to relaxed restrictions on dominant firm conduct.73 Vertical re-
straints were also relaxed.74 Finally, antitrust and IP were no longer at
odds.75
In Period 4, the pendulum began to swing back in some areas, but the
loosening of antitrust restrictions continued overall. Procedural shifts made
it harder for plaintiffs to bring class actions.76 In terms of substance, the bur-
den shift became harder for plaintiffs in some rule of reason cases77 and
where the Court imposed new limits to state action.78 But in other areas
there was pushback against big tech companies,79 more aggressiveness in
terms of cases in reverse payments,80 and a number of lower court wins to
67. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and
Legal Thinking, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000, at 43, 43–60.
68. Dale W. Jorgenson et al., A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Re-
surgence, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2008, at 3, 3.
69. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 195–96 (2010); Bus. El-
ecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–31 (1988); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–93 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771–74 (1984).
70. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–63 (2007);Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
585–88.
71. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
72. See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–21 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991).
73. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 446–47 (2009); Veri-
zon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–11 (2004);
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24 (1993); Spec-
trum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 458 (1993); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600–05 (1985).
74. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897–99 (2007);
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 175–82 (2006); Brooke
Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24; Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984); Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760–64 (1984).
75. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–46 (2006).
76. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011); see also Am. Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231–39 (2013).
77. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284, 2288 (2018).
78. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 230–32 (2013).
79. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
80. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 141 (2013).
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limit anticompetitive vertical restraints in the new economy81 and in
healthcare mergers.82
III. THE POPULISTATTACK ONCONSUMERWELFARE ISMISGUIDED
Wu is hostile to the consumer welfare standard used in antitrust, con-
cluding that the multiple-goals approach to “antitrust law, which dared dic-
tate what the economy should look like, needed to be put into hibernation—
perhaps forever” (p. 92). Yet, the consumer welfare standard that Wu attacks
is not the actual consumer welfare standard articulated by Bork and the Chi-
cago School. Bork’s consumer welfare was actually total welfare; Bork clever-
ly called it consumer welfare likely in part because it was a better slogan.83
The difference between the two, put simply, is that total welfare is the aggre-
gate welfare of both producers and consumers, whereas consumer welfare
focuses only on the welfare consequences of consumers.84 Though at first the
Supreme Court understood consumer welfare the way that Bork did,85 today
when the Court refers to consumer welfare it really means consumer wel-
fare.86 Most of the time, consumer welfare and total welfare yield the same
result.
Consumer welfare does not really mean consumer welfare for Wu either.
Wu’s real concern is that antitrust has been guided by industrial organiza-
tion economics and how economic evidence must match up with theories of
harm. He would broaden antitrust to go beyond economic analysis and in-
clude a wider range of criteria that would be more democratic (p. 135). For
example, Wu proposes public filing of industry comments on major mergers
and of consent agreement remedies put up for public comment (p. 130). Wu
claims that “big mergers are political, and the idea that the public or its rep-
resentatives be kept in the dark is hard to support” (p. 130), thereby politiciz-
ing the merger review process. Such an approach is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s implicit warning in Trinko that antitrust courts are ill-suited “to act
81. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2015).
82. See United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017); FTC v. Penn
State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 347–51 (3d Cir. 2016); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015); ProMedica Health
Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2014).
83. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust:
An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 473 (2012) (stating that Bork “[used] the term
‘consumer welfare’ when he meant total welfare”). Some commentators find a more sinister
view of Bork’s purposeful confusion. See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Funda-
mental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191, 199–200 (2008). In fact, total welfare had its origins with the Harvard School a dec-
ade before Bork. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 692–93 (2010).
84. Blair & Sokol, supra note 83, at 473.
85. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
86. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 902 (2007).
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as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of
dealing.”87
Such an outcome would be “results” oriented because broader concepts
like “fairness” would by definition be fair in the eye of the beholder, and cer-
tain outcomes would be reverse engineered via case law because they were
“fair.” It is for this reason that Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp are
wary about the use of fairness in antitrust, noting that fairness is “a vagrant
claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.”88 Similarly, Donald
Turner cautions that populism “would broaden antitrust’s proscriptions to
cover business conduct that has no significant anticompetitive effects, would
increase vagueness in the law, and would discourage conduct that promotes
efficiencies not easily recognized or proved.”89
The notion of what consumer welfare means has shifted as economic
learning has shifted. These shifts become embraced in case law. An example
in this shift involves healthcare mergers and market definition. After losing
healthcare mergers, the FTC undertook a merger retrospective to under-
stand hospital markets better.90 Taking in more recent economic advances,91
the FTC uncovered that the Elzinga–Hogarty market definition test92 was
flawed and overinclusive.93 By using case law to rework theory, better empir-
ical tools, and more data, the FTC won in Evanston to undo a consummated
hospital merger.94 Since that case, the FTC has had a much stronger track
record of winning hospital merger cases because of the courts’ embrace of
more sophisticated economic models.95
87. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
88. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 109–10 (4th ed.
2013).
89. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Poli-
cy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
90. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Everything Old Is New
Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century, Speech at the 7th Annual Competi-
tion in Health Care Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/public_statements/everything-old-new-again-health-care-and-competition-21st-century/mu
rishealthcarespeech0211.pdf [https://perma.cc/A98W-4BEF].
91. Corey S. Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of Economics
on Hospital Merger Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443 (2014) (reviewing the shift).
92. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market De-
lineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
93. David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S.
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J.L. & ECON. 123 (1987).
94. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195, at *3 (F.T.C.
Aug. 6, 2007).
95. See HEALTH CARE DIV., BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
OVERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 50–82 (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/overview_health
_care_august_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEH5-WXBV].
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Overall, economic analysis allows for a truly fair system—one that is de-
cided by facts and real economic effects—not merely one side complaining
more loudly than the other as to what is fair.96 Professor Froeb and his coau-
thors summarize the shift and why technocracy is better as follows:
Forty years ago . . . inference was primitive, drawn mainly from the Struc-
ture-Conduct-Performance paradigm, and supported mainly by cross-
industry regressions of price or profit on industry concentration. In anti-
trust trials, it was not uncommon for opposing experts to opine about the
effects of a merger based on little in the way of economic theory or empiri-
cal evidence, and without offering any mapping from either to their opin-
ions. Economic analysis now occupies a central role in antitrust
enforcement and credible expert opinions are derived from theoretical and
empirical models.97
This insight explains that it is consumer welfare that offers democratic
legitimacy. Cases come down to facts—and analysis to explain these facts—
rather than to a popularity contest. The transition to greater economic anal-
ysis in cases was a result of an organizational shift that gave equal weight to
economists in U.S. antitrust agencies as to the lawyers.98 When the econo-
mists have a say in working through cases, they can rethink economic mod-
els based on facts to better represent reality, whether using static or dynamic
models.99
One reason for Wu’s hostility to economic analysis is his concern that
the consumer welfare standard fails to take non-price issues into considera-
tion (p. 135). Yet consumer welfare can address non-price issues. In fact, it
does so regularly. Wu cannot really believe that non-price antitrust analysis
is a problem with antitrust. Many of the important conduct cases of the Chi-
cago School era that Wu studies address non-price competition (p. 131).
Both at the Supreme Court level and at the lower court level, antitrust
courts have dealt with non-price issues (often with price elements as well) on
a regular basis.100 Non-price factors are not new to antitrust.101 Moreover,
the Supreme Court expressly acknowledges that it can deal with dynamic is-
96. As the father of three wonderful children, I have learned that fairness means “fair is
if I benefit but not if I don’t,” followed by name-calling across children, shouting, and hurt
feelings. When more money is at stake like in antitrust, the name-calling and screaming are
worse.
97. Luke M. Froeb et al., Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018, 53 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 637, 638 (2018).
98. See Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 569, 575–77 (2009).
99. See generally THEOXFORDHANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
(Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
100. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44–45 (2006); Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483–85 (1992); United States v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 150, 166–70 (D.D.C. 1982).
101. See United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901–04 (D. Md. 1916).
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sues in antitrust.102 Indeed, history has shown that antitrust is focused not
merely on short-term effects but also on long-run effects. For example,
Learned Hand wrote in 1916, “the consumer’s interest in the long run is
quite different from an immediate fall in prices.”103 Thus, economic learning
helps shapes how agencies and courts view antitrust.104
Given the significant case law on non-price-related antitrust, Wu is un-
willing to express what the attack on the consumer welfare standard is really
about for him: the creation of an antitrust regulatory regime rather than an
antitrust enforcement regime. That is, Wu implicitly wants to turn the anti-
trust agencies into a regulatory body with multiple goals and prospective
oversight—akin to the FCC, an agency he has studied extensively. Yet, ad-
ministrative agencies are rife with capture concerns.105 Further, the FCC’s
record on mergers that Wu decries on the antitrust side is not strong. The
FCC, using the public interest standard to review the same mergers as the
antitrust agencies, also allowed for significant consolidation.106 This is true
for the FAA in airline industries, too. And various financial regulators (such
as the OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC) that allowed financial ser-
vices consolidation also have multiple goals. A public-interest-standard ap-
proach also assumes that government has the public interest in mind such
that it responds to preferences by consumers and does not try to shape
them.107
IV. WHATWEKNOWABOUT PLATFORM TECH AND INNOVATION
Large tech companies should be feared, Wu suggests (pp. 21–22). Wu
connects big tech’s “ubiquity” to a nondescript “sense of concern” about
their power, which he describes as a “kingly prerogative” (p. 21). Focusing
on a handful of companies, Wu explains that “[t]here stopped being a next
new thing, or at least, a new thing that was a serious challenge to the old
thing” (p. 121). Broad-brushed critiques do not fully appreciate different
business models and competition concerns that may arise with different
102. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the com-
mon law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term
in 1890.”).
103. United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
104. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 67, at 43.
105. See Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State:
Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 93, 99 (2016); Stigler, supra note 10; see also Simon F.
Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S.
President’s Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507 (2015) (observing
regulatory capture by interest groups in the Office of Management and Budget review process);
Sokol, supra note 10, at 1037, 1039.
106. See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger
Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 372–73 (2006).
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501
(2000) (“There is a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.”).
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types of technology platforms. For example, e-commerce platforms have a
different model than cloud computing, social networks, fintech platforms,
P2P platforms, and various types of search-related platforms, even though all
compete on some level for advertising and users. Further, Wu ignores the
rise of Chinese tech platforms as such Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, DiDi, Xiao-
mi, and Ctrip, which create global competition for Western firms both di-
rectly and in the market for vertical acquisitions.108
While such broad-brushed critiques may score political points with
populists on both the left and the right, antitrust analysis requires an inquiry
that marries economic theory to evidence. In practice, working through an
analysis of tech platforms, which includes elements such as market definition
and the substantive analysis of economic effects, is complex.109
Since Wu does not make a specific claim as to the evidence of the mo-
nopolization case that would require antitrust intervention and the extreme
remedy of structural breakup, he focuses instead on the issue of nascent
technology–related acquisitions by tech companies. Wu is concerned that
acquisitions involving nascent technology and potential nascent competitors
might have negative competitive effects if established tech platforms acquire
smaller firms (p. 123).
Predicting future champions among tech companies is not easy. If it
were, law and entrepreneurship would not be defined as a distinct field be-
cause of the inherent uncertainty of such investments. Entrepreneurship is
complicated and exit strategies vary.110 But a structural fix like Wu recom-
mends would hurt innovation.
What makes entrepreneurship unique is that it involves high risk.111
Venture capitalists (VCs) have a portfolio of investments to reduce risk be-
cause any one investment is not likely to yield big returns.112 This is im-
portant given the limited time frame (typically ten years) in which the capital
needs to be returned at the end of the fund.113 As such, VCs do not make
108. See, e.g., Hasan Chowdhury, China’s Tech Giants Have Conquered the East, Now for
the West, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018
/09/23/chinas-tech-giants-have-conquered-east-now-west/ [https://perma.cc/9FQF-HBW8].
109. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). See generally David S. Ev-
ans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses, in 1 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 99, at 404;
Thomas Eisenmann et al., Platform Envelopment, 32 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1270 (2011); Feng
Zhu &Marco Iansiti, Entry into Platform-Based Markets, 33 STRATEGICMGMT. J. 88 (2012).
110. Dawn R. DeTienne et al., Making Sense of Entrepreneurial Exit Strategies: A Typolo-
gy and Test, 30 J. BUS. VENTURING 255, 256 (2015).
111. William R. Kerr et al., Entrepreneurship as Experimentation, J. ECON. PERSP., Sum-
mer 2014, at 25, 25–26.
112. See id. at 26.
113. GEOFFREY GREGSON, FINANCING NEW VENTURES: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO
BUSINESSANGEL INVESTMENT 31 (2014).
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money on over half of their investments.114 Corporate venture capital (CVC)
invests in a portfolio of companies for similar reasons.115 To protect them-
selves from entrepreneurial holdup, VCs create a series of legal mechanisms
(negative covenants) to ensure some control even when they lack voting con-
trol.116
It would be a mistake to assume that antitrust enforcers could easily fig-
ure out which nascent firms might be competitors, let alone which firms
might develop new markets. Wu understates how difficult it is to figure out
the next sets of winners and losers. With significantly more information than
an outsider (such as an antitrust agency reviewing a deal), even the best VCs
and CVCs have trouble picking winners and losers. Just because a larger firm
acquires a start-up does not mean that the best technologies, people, and
ideas can be implemented to capture value from the acquisition.117 Though it
is possible that a particular transaction might create competition problems,
the solution is to address specific deals with a sufficient factual record. To
wholesale attack an entire business model that has been the primary form of
exit for entrepreneurs not merely in platform-based tech but in biotech118
would create economy-wide problems. When certain avenues for firm exit,
such as vertical acquisition by larger firms, are closed off via limits to acqui-
sition because of an overly stringent antitrust regime, it hurts the entrepre-
neurial ecosystem. Entrepreneurs would be chilled from creating start-ups if
they could not easily create a liquidity event to extract financial rewards
from their investment.119
V. ROBINSON-PATMAN ENFORCEMENT IS THEULTIMATE EXPRESSION OF
NEO-BRANDEISIANANTITRUST
There is a natural experiment that tests the Wu hypothesis of what anti-
trust would look like with a different set of goals, which until relatively re-
cently diverged fundamentally from the Chicago School approach found in
Sherman and Clayton Act jurisprudence—the Robinson-Patman Act. Rob-
114. Michael Ewens et al., Cost of Experimentation and the Evolution of Venture Capital,
128 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 423 (2018) (describing this as a “spray and pray” strategy).
115. See Will Drover et al., A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing
Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and
Accelerators, 43 J. MGMT. 1820, 1835 (2017).
116. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 319–
20 (2005).
117. See Russell W. Coff, How Buyers Cope with Uncertainty when Acquiring Firms in
Knowledge-Intensive Industries: Caveat Emptor, 10 ORG. SCI. 144, 144 (1999).
118. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Bio-
tech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 307, 325 (2007); see also Nils Behnke &
Norbert Hültenschmidt, New Path to Profits in Biotech: Taking the Acquisition Exit, 78 J. COM.
BIOTECH 78, 78 (2007).
119. D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357,
1377 (2018).
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inson-Patman enforcement can teach us about what a more populist anti-
trust would entail.
If Wu wants a return to Brandeisian-style populism in antitrust, this re-
quires a change in antitrust law given the current development of judge-
made antitrust case law. But Wu’s neo-Brandeisian critique and his push for
new law should be informed by the negative experience of the interpretation
and enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.120
Unlike the other antitrust statutes, the Robinson-Patman Act was ex-
pressly protectionist in its drafting.121 Further, its negative economic effect
on efficiency is unambiguous.122 A review of Robinson-Patman doctrinal
shifts and scholarship suggests what Chicago did well in shifting an ineffi-
cient rule that hurt consumers, particularly poor ones. A review of Robin-
son-Patman and its decline also reflects the limitations of Chicago School
economic analysis: what worked with regard to the analytical shift to Robin-
son-Patman was a function of economic consensus, as opposed to a number
of areas of antitrust analysis where the economic literature suggests that Chi-
cago-based antitrust analysis is coarse or potentially outdated.123
Academics have attacked the Robinson-Patman Act for decades because
of the unambiguous harm to consumers that its enforcement has created.124
Thus, on consumer welfare grounds the Act is an abomination. In this sense,
both antitrust enforcers on the left and the right had a shared vision of the
Act—the economics were disastrous.125 Nevertheless, the Robinson-Patman
Act has been shrouded in “democratic” values.
The origin of the Robinson-Patman Act126 was based on protection of
small retailers from larger, more efficient competitors (large buyers).127 Orig-
inally titled the “Wholesale Grocer’s Protection Act,” there were no multiple
purposes to the Act akin to the Sherman Act, such that one could reasonably
claim any sort of efficiency rationale for Robinson-Patman.128 Rather, the
Act was protectionism of a special interest under the guise of “fairness.”
120. See Sokol, supra note 31.
121. Id. at 2069.
122. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 312–25
(2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EAB5-VXL8].
123. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 257.
124. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 384 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1976); Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie and the
Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1978); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rob-
inson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 125 (2000);
Sokol, supra note 31.
125. ANTITRUSTMODERNIZATIONCOMM’N, supra note 122, at i, iii.
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13a (2012).
127. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2069.
128. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit
Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 128 (2009).
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Thus, whereas the Supreme Court explained that “[a]ntitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enter-
prise,”129 the Robinson-Patman Act has been called the “Magna Carta of
Small Business.”130 The Supreme Court articulated how the Robinson-
Patman Act embraces fairness over other goals:
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly
clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could se-
cure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large
buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed
to deprive a large buyer of such advantages . . . .131
In fact, size (and potential scale-related efficiencies) is what drives down
prices for consumers. Thus, to protect inefficient competitors, Robinson-
Patman required a trade-off that hurt end consumers.132 Because Robinson-
Patman originally served to stymie the growth of the largest supermarket,
the result is that the trade-off was regressive—those vulnerable consumers
who needed lower prices were the ones most hurt by choosing a “fair” ap-
proach to antitrust to protect small stores.
This anti-bigness bias was pronounced in decades of Robinson-Patman
jurisprudence in which large companies were punished merely for using
buyer size to offer price reductions.133 Thus, Robinson-Patman enforcement
was a response to fears of size.134 As Chief Judge Diane Wood recently noted,
“Its fit with antitrust policy is awkward, as it was principally designed to pro-
tect small businesses . . . .”135 For this reason, the Supreme Court explained
that the Robinson-Patman Act “was intended to justify a finding of ‘injury to
competition by a showing of injury to the competitor victimized by the dis-
crimination.’ ”136
Much of FTC enforcement in the 1950s and 1960s focused on Robinson-
Patman violations.137 Overall, because of a favorably worded statute that re-
129. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
130. Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Look Backwards, a
View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 571 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1738, at 1
(1975)).
131. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948).
132. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 122, at 317 (“[T]he Robinson-
Patman Act is not targeted at harmful price discrimination. Rather, it condemns low prices.”);
id. at 318 (“The economic reality is that price differences and price discrimination typically
benefit, not harm, consumers. To the extent that price discrimination (as defined by econo-
mists) may harm consumer welfare, other antitrust laws already address such conduct.”).
133. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2070–76.
134. Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 439
(2012) (“The inertia of fears of size seems to be embedded in antitrust.”).
135. Woodman’s Food Mkt. v. Clorox Co., 833 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2016).
136. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 49 (footnote omitted).
137. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2071–73.
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quired no showing of market power, plaintiffs often won these cases.138 But
the Supreme Court slowly chipped away at the pro-plaintiff case law by re-
quiring antitrust injury and a showing of consumer welfare loss even though
nothing in the statute required either.139 Change to Robinson-Patman hap-
pened gradually. It included a unilateral declaration by DOJ that it would
not enforce the Robinson-Patman Act because the Act had a “deleterious
impact on competition.”140 Similarly, the FTC noted that the Act was protec-
tionist.141 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, the Supreme Court be-
gan to reign in Robinson-Patman enforcement so that it did not have “open
conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation.”142 Further, the
Court applied the Sherman Act antitrust injury concept to the Act to limit
the number of Robinson-Patman cases.143 In Brooke Group, the Court made
sure not to repeal the Act but read in a consumer welfare goal to Robinson-
Patman where none existed.144 Thus, the Court pushed the interpretation far,
but not so far as to provoke a legislative response.
Robinson-Patman created some of the worst decisions in antitrust histo-
ry in the sense that they hurt consumers.145 Those consumers who benefit
the most from low prices—the poor—bore the brunt of higher food prices.146
To the extent that there was a trade-off that supported smaller and ineffi-
cient competitors, such competitors benefited over the most vulnerable
members of society.
Utah Pie epitomized the failure of Robinson-Patman. In the case, na-
tional competitors entered the Salt Lake City market where Utah Pie had
two-thirds market share.147 As a result of competition, the price of pie de-
creased.148 However, Utah Pie’s market share decreased to just under 50 per-
138. See id. at 2070–78.
139. Id. at 2077–83.
140. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 250 (1977); see also
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 516 (3d ed. 1990) (“[T]he brunt of the Commission’s effort fell upon the small
businesses Congress sought to protect.”).
141. Recent Efforts to Amend or Repeal the Robinson-Patman Act—Part 2: Hearing Before
the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act & Related Matters of the H.
Comm. on Small Bus., 94th Cong. 141 (1975) (statement of Frederic M. Scherer, Director, Bu-
reau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n).
142. 440 U.S. 69, 80 (1979).
143. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981).
144. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993).
145. Roger D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, “Antitrust’s Least Glorious Hour”: The Rob-
inson-Patman Act, 57 J.L. & ECON. S201, S213 (2014).
146. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 122, at 322–25; Elzinga & Ho-
garty, supra note 124, at 432–33 (providing estimates of the administrative costs of Robinson-
Patman enforcement).
147. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 689 (1967).
148. See id. at 690.
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cent even while its sales and profits increased.149 The Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Utah Pie (protection of a competitor) and against competition.150
Worse, during this period Robinson-Patman was enforced criminally.151
Thus, a low-cost pie that benefited consumers could potentially land a baker
in jail. Such is the perverse effect of “political” antitrust.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust works well because it is technocratic in that a singular (but
flexible within its economics) goal is administrable institutionally. To intro-
duce the world of political imperfections into a technical process that exam-
ines markets would create further distortions affecting consumers.152
Antitrust does well dealing with antitrust problems. To the extent that there
are other related problems, the right answer is not to create an antitrust that
lacks democratic accountability (because antitrust becomes regulation via
the backdoor) and exceeds its mandate of the past forty years. Rather, the
better solution is to identify the underlying problem and solve it with more
effective tools. If the problem is one of redistribution, tax is a better choice
than antitrust.153 If the problem is one of privacy, strengthen privacy laws.154
If the problem is one of financial institutions or sector regulators not doing
what they need to do, correct structural problems with sector regulators. An-
titrust has increasingly moved out of sector regulation155 and toward advoca-
cy.156 The advocacy budget of the antitrust agencies is tiny, and to the extent
that the problem is the rules of the game for particular industry sectors, Wu
falls short by not suggesting greater competition advocacy.
Wu’s concern with big tech companies because they are big (p. 126) is as
misplaced now as it was earlier in antitrust history. Antitrust has gone
through various moments in which it had reevaluated whether it has the
proper tools to combat anticompetitive behavior in technology-related mar-
kets.157 It does have such tools and can bring important cases in these mar-
149. See id.
150. See generally id.
151. D. Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545
(2019).
152. Gary S. Becker, Competition and Democracy, 1 J.L. & ECON. 105 (1958).
153. Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in THE
GOALS OFCOMPETITION LAW 3, 5 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).
154. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protec-
tion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV 2230 (2015).
155. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
156. James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005).
157. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust in High-Technology In-
dustries: A Symposium Introduction, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 449 (2012) (providing an
overview).
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kets.158 It was just a decade ago that we were told that Walmart was taking
over shopping, that eBay was the largest online marketplace, or that Face-
book was the primary way in which users shared information. Today, Uber
competes with Lyft, Amazon has eclipsed eBay, Facebook is a legacy service,
and younger people use any other set of applications to share information—
such as Pinterest, Twitter, or Snapchat. In a world of continuous change, an-
titrust is what remains constant. It has the tools to police against unlawful
exercise of monopoly power and adapts to changes in economic theory and
empirics. To ask antitrust to go beyond its institutional capacity sets up anti-
trust to fail, because Wu’s deeper concern is with how society is structured.
That structure can be changed through elections to the presidency and Con-
gress and through changes as to the makeup of the Supreme Court. Antitrust
history shows that it is the Supreme Court that changes antitrust law and
policy the most because of antitrust’s common law–like nature.159
158. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419
(2016).
159. Deborah A. Garza, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks on Modernization of Antitrust Law – Private and Public Enforcement and Abuses –
Europe and the U.S. (May 29, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519641/download
[https://perma.cc/NU5G-NTVN] (“Even the most passionate critics of current enforcement
policy recognize the constraining influence of existing case law and, importantly, the substan-
tial degree of consensus that exists today around most aspects of antitrust policy—a consensus
forged on a solid foundation of economic learning. . . . We won’t return to what antitrust en-
forcement looked like 40 years ago.”).
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